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REVIEW ESSAY
MAKING AMERICA COMPETITIVE
MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES
OF OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA (1991) ($24.95, Harvard Business School
Press, Boston, Massachusetts).
MARK J.

I.

LOEWVENSTEIN*

INTRODUCTION

Short-Term America joins a growing list of books and articles
exploring the causes of, and solutions to, America's declining economic fortunes.' This book starts from the widely accepted premise
that American business is too short-term oriented, with corporate
America sacrificing long-term projects and profitability for short-term
gains. Jacobs, and many other critics, argue that the root cause of
this phenomenon is that investors are overly concerned with the nearterm prospects of the corporations in which they invest, making stock
prices overly sensitive to short-term information (generally quarterly
financial results). 2 Because the stock markets are so focused on the

short-term, and corporate management is sensitive to stock market
performance, management is highly motivated to maximize shortterm results, even at the expense of a corporation's long-term interests. 3 This, in turn, has led to the decline of America's ability to
* Professor and Associate Dean, University of Colorado School of Law at
Boulder. J.D., 1974, and B.A., 1969, University of Illinois.
The author wishes to thank his colleagues, Ted Fiflis, J. Dennis Hynes,
Hiroshi Motomura, and Dale Oesterle, who were kind enough to review an earlier
draft of this essay and make helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAwNs OR POTENTATEs: THE REALTY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BoARDs (1989); Louis LowEN.sTsIN,
WHAT'S WRONG wrTH WALL STREET (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agendafor Irstitutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum,
A New System of Corporate Governance, The QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 187 (1991).
2. See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TEt AMRiCA: THE CAUSES AND CURES
OF OUR BusINEss MYOPIA

3. Id.

37-38 (1991).
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compete in the global economy, which has caused many of our
4
current economic woes.

Jacobs provides some support for his premise that American
business is too short-term oriented, by noting the volatility and large
volume of trading in the stock markets and citing surveys of "[t]he
technology community" 5 and the Financial Executives Institute.6 He
also provides anecdotal evidence, stating that America has sys-

tematically abandoned capital-intensive technologies with long-term
growth potential such as robotics, while our foreign competitors,
principally the Japanese and Germans, have exploited these abandoned technologies to their long-term advantage. 7 After establishing,
in a few pages, America's "business myopia," 8 Jacobs spends the
remainder of his book examining its causes (primarily the irresponsible investment policies of institutional investors and a weakness in
our structure of corporate governance) and cures (a new way for
institutional investors to invest and a reformation of corporate governance). Jacobs also discusses the effect of the cost of capital on
business decision making and the weakness of United States banking,
both noted briefly at the end of this essay.
As this essay will focus primarily on proposals to reform corporate
governance, it will discuss only briefly Jacobs's underlying premise
that the United States suffers from too much short-term thinking. 9
But it is important to reflect, at least momentarily, on this premise,
because so much turns on it. 0 The premise that corporate America
focuses too heavily on the short term is not without doubt. First,

4. Id. at 7-8.

5. Id. at 8.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 12-13.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Even if corporate management was properly focused on long-term results,
reformation of corporate governance might still be in order. Ever since Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means published their landmark book, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, in 1932, identifying the separation of ownership from control
in the modern corporation, scholars have recognized that this separation is a source
of potential economic inefficiency and shareholder abuse, because management is

not accountable to the corporation's owners. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
1, at 873. Thus, increasing accountability might (depending on cost) increase the
corporation's efficiency. Id. at 865.

10. The notion that corporate America is too short-term oriented is the
launching point for much of the current debate in corporate governance and financial
reform. It shapes, or at least affects, tax proposals, banking reform, federal fiscal
policy, etc.
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stock prices represent both long-term and short-term returns (appreciation and dividends) that shareholders can expect from the stock.
It may be true that such returns are not "efficiently" incorporated
into the stock price, or that many shareholders are concerned only
with the near-term returns; but it does not follow that the stock
price does not incorporate long-term returns or that shareholder
preferences drive management investment decisions. While Jacobs
attempts to deal with the effects of shareholder preferences on management, he discounts the fact that the long-term value of a corporation must be reflected in its stock price." Since this is true,
management can enhance corporate value with both long-term and
short-term projects. The relative profitability of the available alternatives may, however, be of greater importance to the decision12
making process.
Second, the myopia premise runs counter to some empirical
evidence suggesting that long-term thinking is very much alive in
corporate boardrooms across America. 3 Third, there is anecdotal
11. Jacobs justifies the rationality of stock prices in connection with takeover
premiums, acknowledging that "[the stock market] may not fully appreciate longterm investment strategies, but it does not ignore them." JAcoes, supra note 2, at
108. Jacobs then cites a 1985 study demonstrating that share prices rise when major
capital expenditures are announced. Id. This result would not be expected if investors
ignored long-term profitability.
12. In this regard, the cost of capital, discussed infra in Section III, may be
of far greater importance.
13. See ACADMY INDUSTRY PROGRAM, NATIONAL AcADE.Ny OF SciENcEs, CoRPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND DEvELoP mETr (1990). &e
also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EcoNoMsIsT,

SEC, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP,

TENDER

OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INVESrMNTS (1985) (concluding that statistics do not
support the charge that hostile takeovers prompt short-term decision making); John
Pound et al., Are Takeovers Hostile to Economic Performance?, REGULATioN, Sept./Oct.
1986, at 25, 28-30, 55 (refuting critics' charges that hostile takeovers are motivated
by short-term thinking). These latter studies conclude that the takeover threats of
the 1980s did not cause corporate management to be overly concerned with shortterm results. Moreover, Pound et al. concluded, based on a study of research and
development expenditures, that high or growing institutional ownership does not
"force" corporate managers to prefer activities that enhance short-term earnings
over long-term projects. Id. at 30, 55. See also Gary Hector, "Yes, You Can Mlanage
Long Tenn," FORTUNE, Nov. 21, 1988, at 64 (citing both empirical and anecdotal
evidence on the subject). But see Thomas L. Hazen, 77e Short-TnnmLong-Trm
Dichotomy and Investment Theoy: Implications for Securie Market Regulation and for
Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REv. 137, 184 (1991) ("Measuring empirically the time
horizon managers of American corporations use in planning is obviously difficult.
Although several studies relating to these issues have been undertaken, the results,
perhaps not surprisingly, are in conflict."). While noting the conflicting studies,
Professor Hazen concludes that short-term planning has been overly emphasized
by corporate investors and managers. Id. at 205-06.
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evidence that suggests American business actively engages in long4
term planning and investment.1
Finally, Jacobs never fully explains why shareholder myopia
necessarily translates into management myopia. He suggests that
management focuses on short-term results because they are easier to
explain to shareholders: "corporations strive to produce predictable,
consistent quarterly earnings because with disengaged owners, it is
simply too difficult to explain unexpected results."' 5 Ironically, this
is at odds with another theme that runs throughout this book-that,
as a practical matter, management is not accountable to the shareholders and cannot be replaced by them, because management controls the corporate election machinery. 6
Jacobs dismisses the possibility that his underlying premise may
be mistaken. He suggests that the economic literature to the contrary,
which he does not even cite, is the product of "academics," and
true only in theory. 7 As to the counter-anecdotal evidence, including
American success in capital-intensive industries such as aerospace
and pharmaceuticals, Jacobs responds that these are special cases
with special explanations. 18 Further, he makes no reference to the
voracious appetite of American investors for initial public offerings
in the biotechnology area, where returns are highly speculative and
long term.
What seems to be lacking in the area of corporate manager
behavior is a different sort of research-research that studies what
corporate managers think they are doing, how they go about deciding
what projects to fund, etc. 19 All too many of the conclusions that

14. See LORSCH, supra note 1,at 44 (citing the authors survey of Fortune
1000 directors, over 70% of whom cite long-term outcomes for the corporation as
the most important consideration in corporate decision making); Hector, supra note
13. See generally GORDON DANIELSON & JAY W. LORSCH, DECISION MAKING AT THE

Top 30 (1983) (discussing corporate managers' interests in perpetuating their com-

panies).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
CHARLES

supra note 2, at 38.
Id. at 83-95.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13-14.
There is no dearth of fine books on corporate governance. See, e.g.,
A. ANDERSON & ROBERT N. ANTHONY, THE NEw CORPORATE DIRECTORS:
JACOBS,

INSIGHTS FOR BOARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES

L.

MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY

(1986);

(1971);

LORSCH,

STANLEY C.

supra note 1;
VANCE,

MYLES

CORPORATE

BOARDS, DIRECTORS, AND STRATEGY (1983); JAMES C. WORTHY &
P. NEUSCHEL, EMERGING ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1983). These
books, however, tend to avoid the sort of research suggested in the text.
LEADERSHIP:
ROBERT
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American business is too short-term oriented are reached without
ever asking the actors who are involved. Even the surveys that Jacobs
cites essentially ask people what they think other people are doing,
20
not what they are doing.
Recent work by two legal anthropologists, Professors John M.
Conley and William M. O'Barr, studies institutional investors using
anthropological methods consisting of intensive observation and openended interviewing. 2 1 This work suggests some conclusions about
institutional investors and their investment horizon that are at odds
with the conventional wisdom that institutional investors are too
short-term oriented and are driving corporate management to "shorttermism." This theme is central to the thesis of Short-Term America.Y2
Jacobs may be right in his premise, but it seems that much additional
analysis needs to be done in this area before we can be certain that
the causes of America's lack of competitiveness are being properly
diagnosed.23
II.

THE CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Short-Term America starts from the premise that many of America's
companies are poorly managed, in large part because there is insufficient monitoring (indeed, virtually no monitoring) by the companies' shareholders. 24 Jacobs states that today's investor does not
act like a responsible investor should: selecting companies based on
their fundamentals, following the companies closely after investing
in them, and thoughtfulUy exercising the right to vote the shares
purchased.25 Rather, according to Jacobs, the typical purchaser of
publicly-traded stock is interested either in short-term results, and

20. See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 8.
21. WILLIAm M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY,
WEALTH AND PoWNER OF INsTITUTIONAL INVESTING

FORTUNE AND FOuY: THE
(1992). An essay, based on the

book has been published. John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of

Capital: An Anthropological Investigation of InstitutionalInrestment, 70 N.C. L. R-v. 823
(1992).
22. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 21, at 839-41.
23. See LoRscH, supra note 1. Lorsch's work is similar to that of Professors
Conley and O'Barr, but draws heavily on surveys and interviews of corporate
directors. While quite valuable and useful, it is not a substitute for the more
anthropological-type of study being suggested here.
24. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 10.
25. Id. at 31-39.
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trades a stock based upon a company's short-term profits and losses,26
or purchases a stock only because it is part of an index of stocks. 27
The money managers for the nation's pension funds are guilty
2
of both types of investment failures and are the villains in the book.
The performance of these money managers is under close scrutiny;
if they fail to produce handsome quarterly returns, they are subject
to being replaced. This reality, Jacobs asserts, causes money managers to eschew long-term investing: "Rather than investing long
term in fewer companies that could be followed closely, money
managers engage in active trading of broad portfolios, which is more
likely to produce consistent quarterly results.' '29 Ironically, neither

this nor any other trading strategy has enabled money managers to
outperform the market,30 causing money managers to turn increasingly to indexing by investing in a broad range of stocks having an

26. Id. at 31. Jacobs paints a picture of a legion of investors analyzing quarterly
reports and then trading solely on the basis of those reports. If a corporation earns
less in a particular quarter than analysts had expected, Jacobs would predict a large
selling effort to commence. Id. at 37. There is no empirical basis for this assertion.
Moreover, the "quarterly" phenomenon does not explain the daily trading volume
in corporate stocks. Obviously, something more than the most recent earnings report
is driving daily buy and sell decisions. Current information may be a signal to
investors that their long-term assessment of a company's prospects were mistaken,
and this may cause some traders to buy or sell the stock. Undoubtedly, short-term
prospects of a company may stimulate trading in its stock, but other factors may
predominate.
27. Id. at 54-57.
28. Id. at 50-51.
29. Id. at 51. It is startling that a money manager could achieve (or believe
she could achieve) consistent quarterly results with more active trading. Intuitively,
the opposite would seem to be the case-results would be more consistent with less
trading. If it is true that money managers engage in active trading to achieve
consistent results, and it seems to be true that they engage in active trading, it
would be interesting to know the theory under which they are operating. For
instance, if Company A reports higher than expected quarterly results, does the
money manager acquire that stock, figuring that the next quarter will also exceed
expectations, and cause yet a higher stock price, or does she sell, figuring the stock
price has absorbed all the increase that the market will give it, and buy a stock
that had disappointing earnings? The reader is left to speculate on what this means
as a practical matter and accept the notion that money managers are churning
stock to enhance short-term returns in their portfolios.
30. The inability of pension fund managers to outperform the Standard &
Poor's 500 (S&P 500) is widely known. Lest there be any doubt, a recent study
by the Brookings Institute reconfirms this proposition. This study found that in
1989, for instance, 61% of actively managed pension funds had a return lower
than the S&P 500. Josef Lakonishok et al., The Structure and Performance of the Money
Management Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoNoMIc ACTIvITY 339 (1992).
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overall performance will mirror the market's performance. Typically,
an index fund will hold the stocks of the Standard & Poor's 500
and/or some other common measure of the stock market's performance, such as the Wilshire 5000, with the result that a fund will
own the shares of hundreds of companies.
In terms of America's competitiveness, both short-term investing
and indexing are evils, because in each case the investor is unconcerned with the company's fundamentals, the skills of its management, or its long-term prospects. This investor indifference, in turn,
has caused corporate management to view the company's shareholders
with indifference, or even contempt,31 making it easy for management
to adopt measures that entrench itself in power.s2 Surprisingly, Jacobs
never links these inconsistencies. If corporate management is indifferent to the shareholders, why is it so driven to satisfy them by
generating short-term profits at the expense of the long-term well
being of the corporation? Jacobs recognizes one possible explanation,
the threat of a hostile takeover, cannot provide the answer, as this
threat has largely abated.
During the 1980s, hostile takeovers provided some market discipline for incompetent management. If a company's assets were not
being employed to their greatest and best use, the market price of
the company's stock would reflect this underutilization and provide
an opportunity for a profitable takeover. The unavailability of financing, structural defenses adopted by companies (chiefly, though
by no means exclusively, in the form of "poison pills") and changes
in state laws have made the hostile takeover a much less common
phenomenon. In any event, the market for corporate control was
inefficient as a monitoring device, since relatively few companies
33
were affected, while many (presumably) were poorly managed.

31. See, e.g., Sarah Bartlett, Big Funds Pressing for Voice in Management of
Companies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1990, at Al, D5.
32. Most large, publicly-held companies now have in place "poison pills"
that, in effect, make a hostile takeover impractical without the approval of the
target board or judicial intervention. Other structural impediments that many
companies have adopted to make a change of control more difficult to achieve
include a staggered board of directors, in which only a third of the directors are
up for election in a year, and so-called "shark repellant" charter provisions such
as supermajority voting provisions, requiring a greater number of votes than the
statutory minimum to approve mergers and other transactions that an acquiror
might desire.
33. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corparate Control: A
CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Gorernance, 84 COLut. L. Rv.
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Moreover, there is a good deal of empirical evidence indicating that
the threat of a hostile takeover did not motivate corporate manage34
ment to focus excessively on the short term.
Jacobs has little regard for the corporate board of directors, the
institution that is supposed to provide the monitoring and direction
that he finds so lacking. He is correct, of course, in noting that the
boards of large companies typically consist of chief executive officers
(CEOs) of other large publicly-traded companies, presidents of highly
visible nonprofit institutions and senior officers of the company itself.3
The non-employee, or "outside," directors do not have the time or
the incentive to take an active role in monitoring the performance
of the company's officers.3 6 The directors tend to be handpicked by
the CEO and have little stake in the company they are directing (in
either the form of stock ownership or otherwise).
This, then, is the principal problem that Jacobs seeks to address
in Short-Term America-how to alter our patterns of investment and
system of corporate governance so that there will be someone in
place to monitor, and thereby improve, the performance of corporate
management. 37 Corporate boards of directors, as currently constituted, are inadequate, lacking the incentive and the wherewithal to
undertake the task. Shareholders, even those institutional investors
who own large portions of their portfolio companies' stock, also lack
the necessary incentives and resources to do the job. Moreover, in
the case of shareholders, there are numerous laws and regulations
that discourage the inter-shareholder communication that would be
necessary for them to exercise their voting rights in a concerted
38
fashion, were they so inclined.

Against this backdrop, Jacobs proposes reforms that would,
among other things, change the way institutions invest, directors are

1145, 1192-95 (1984) (describing the deterrent impact of hostile takeovers); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1497-99
(1989) (noting the pitfalls of the takeover market).
34. See Pound et al., supra note 13.
35. JAcoBs, supra note 2, at 81.
36. See generally LORSCH, supra note 1, at 23-30 (explaining the reasons for
rejecting an offer of board membership).
37. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 225-31.
38. Id. at 83-95. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 99-118. Responding to
increasing concern in this area, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has proposed some modest reforms to facilitate inter-shareholder communication.
Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders and Executive Compensation
Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249).
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elected, and executives are compensated. Each of these proposals has
some merit and is worthy of comment.-9
A.

Institutional Investment Practices

Jacobs proposes that institutional investors pool a portion of
their funds to create "investment partnerships" that would invest
in selected corporations on a long-term basis, providing the sort of
counselling that corporations currently lack. 40 Jacobs contends that

39. Jacobs also suggests the necessity of major reform of our system of
commercial banking and some minor changes in shareholder voting laws. JACoas,
supra note 2, at 10-11. With respect to the banking industry, reforms generally
should be designed to encourage greater participation by the banks in the business
of their commercial borrowers, thereby (hopefully) realizing some of the advantages
of the German and Japanese banking systems, where banks provide oversight and
guidance, as well as capital. Id.
With respect to shareholder voting, Jacobs proposes two changes (in addition
to his proposals regarding the election of directors). First, he suggests that shareholders should be able to change the corporation's state of incorporation, by a
majority vote. Id. at 99-100. Jacobs believes that states would then compete with
one another to pass laws most favorable to the shareholders. Id. Second, Jacobs
suggests that matters on which shareholders vote be determined by a plurality of
the votes cast, rather than requiring that motions be passed by a majority of the
shares outstanding. Id. at 89-90. The policy of this proposal is to reverse current
law that, in effect, treats non-voted shares as negative, so that shareholder initiatives
fail even when a majority of the shares voted favored the initiative. These are fairly
minor matters that do not require lengthy comment.
As to reincorporation (the technical term for changing the state of incorporation), the decision is generally left to a majority vote of the shareholders. A
reincorporation is effectuated by creating a shell corporation in the state in which
the corporation desires to reincorporate, and then merging the existing corporation
into the shell corporation. The shell corporation is the surviving entity, with all of
the assets and liabilities of the original corporation. Generally, a merger requires
a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares of the corporation. See, e.g., RavLsna
MODEL BUSINESS Coap. Acr § 11.03(e) (1984).
Although shareholders cannot generally initiate mergers, an improved system
of corporate governance would seem to minimize this shortcoming and render it
moot. If corporate governance remained unchanged, shareholders would enjoy little
benefit from the ability to change the state of incorporation. Moreover, it seems
unrealistic to expect that many reincorporations would take place, given the logistical
difficulties of the process. Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect competition among
the states for more "shareholder friendly" statutes.
As to the plurality vote proposal, Jacobs is a bit behind the times. A committee
of the American Bar Association made such a recommendation in connection with
its proposed revision of the Model Business Corporation Act in 1984, and that
proposed revision is slowly becoming law throughout the United States. &e id.
§ 7.25(c). In any event, this proposal, too, is minor in comparison to meaningful
reform in corporate governance.

40.

JACoBS,

supra note 2, at 219-25.
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by investing in several such partnerships, a pension fund will achieve
both diversification and meaningful corporate ownership, satisfying
two key investment objectives. 4' Most importantly, these newly-created investment partnerships, by virtue of their "ownership" role
that contemplates board membership, will realize above-average re42
turns on their investments.
In essence, Jacobs is trying to duplicate the success of Warren
Buffett with this proposal.4 3 Buffett's company, Berkshire Hathaway
Inc., is such an investor. Berkshire Hathaway is well-known for its
technique of investing large sums of money in a few corporations
and then playing an active role on the boards of those companies.
As a result of its ability to pick good companies in which to invest,
or its ability to provide valuable help to those companies, or both,
Berkshire Hathaway has been able to realize above average returns
for its investors. Naturally, Jacobs believes the success of Berkshire
Hathaway is attributable more to its patience and good counsel than
to its ability to select stocks. 4
Regardless of whether Jacobs's assertion that Berkshire Hathaway's success is attributable to its post-investment activities is correct, one might reasonably wonder why more such investment vehicles
have not emerged from Wall Street. If nothing else, Wall Street has
a knack for providing new products to fill every conceivable demand.
Wall Street's failure to produce investment vehicles resembling Berkshire Hathaway suggests that the nation's pension funds are not
really interested in such a form of investment, despite its potential
benefits.
Even assuming that the funds would invest in these new partnerships, there are some reasons to be skeptical of this proposal.
Would the portfolio companies welcome their new partners? Would
the investment partnerships be able to influence management? Who
would monitor the management of the investment partnerships? Most
importantly, is there any reason to believe that the organizers of
these investment partnerships will have the skill of Warren Buffett?
Buffett may be successful not only because he is a long-term investor
who is able to command the respect of, as well as influence, corporate
managers, but also because he has particularly good instincts in this
area. Buffett is unique, and it is unlikely that there are many
individuals possessing both his skill and instinct.
41. Id. at 220-22.
42. Id. at 224-25.
43. See id. at 222.
44. Id.
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As a practical matter, one must also wonder from where this
cadre of super counsellors will arise. 45 By defmition, the managers

of investment partnerships must be astute investors and capable
managers, able to monitor full time the companies in which they
invest. These counsellors will have to be different from the individuals
who currently serve on corporate boards as independent directors,
who have already proven unworthy of the task. Thus, recycled CEOs,
and the like, will be in little demand. And, this cadre will have to
be large, as the nation's pension funds have several hundred billion
dollars to invest,4 and several hundred companies in which to invest.
Despite these criticisms, the idea is a good one. Whether or not
America's corporations are being properly managed from a longterm perspective, it appears that there is something seriously wrong
in America's boardrooms. A symptom of this disfunction is executive
compensation, the extravagance of which suggests a callous disregard
on the part of corporate boards toward their fiduciary duties. Executive compensation has risen dramatically over the past several
years, 47 and this rise does not seem to be driven by market forces
or explained by corporate performance.' CEOs of comparably large
Japanese and German companies earn a fraction of what their American counterparts earn. 49
The explanation of this phenomenon invariably focuses on the
failure of the board of directors. Theoretically, the typical board

45. The increase in pension fund assets and an increased interest in corporate
governance on the part of pension fund managers has given rise to a growing
industry of companies that consult with pension funds on matters of corporate
governance and proxy voting. Companies such as Institutional Shareholder Services,
Inc., Analysis Group, Inc., and Institutional Voting Research Service provide this
type of consulting services.
46. Actually, pension fund assets now exceed $2.5 trillion. James A. White,
Giant Pension Funds' Explosive Growth Concentrates Economic Assets and Power, WALL ST.
J., June 28, 1990, at C1. Institutional investors as a group control assets in excess
of $6 trillion. William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference-, HAnv. Bus.
REv., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70.

47. Compensation of CEOs has tripled over the last decade. &.- John A.
Byrne et al., Executive Pay, Bus. Wx., Mar. 30, 1992, at 52. Surveying the 1991
proxy statements of 350 large companies, a Wall Stret Journal article concluded that
median CEO pay, including salary, bonuses, and long-term incentives, was $1.3
million in 1991. The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at R9 (Executive Pay
Supplement) (compiled by Towers Perrin).
48. Graef S. Crystal, The Great CEO Pay Sweepstakes, FORTUNE, June 18, 1990,
at 94; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentires, It's Not How Much
You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138.
49. Fat Cats in U.S. OuteamJapanese,JAPAN Ttas WEEKLY INT'L ED., Feb. 1016, 1992, at C2 (Kazuko Takahashi trans.)
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should be able to set the pay of its CEO at a fair amount. Generally,

executive compensation is determined by a committee of the board
that does not include employees of the company and is advised by
an independent compensation consultant. But, it is doubtful that
CEO pay that is determined in this manner is the best deal for the
shareholders for several reasons. First, most board members owe
their positions on the board, directly or indirectly, to the CEO whose
compensation they are fixing. Of equal importance, many of these
directors are themselves corporate CEOs and, therefore, have an
interest in seeing CEO compensation rise.50 Finally, the compensation
consultant is often appointed by the CEO. Thus, the directors and
the consultant have a built-in bias in favor of higher compensation
for the CEO than he or she might be willing to accept.
The executive pay scandal suggests that the CEO dominates or
controls the board, rather than the reverse. 51 This relationship was
frequently confirmed during the 1980s, when boards acted to preserve
management's position in the face of attractive takeover offers5 2 or
approve management-initiated buy-outs that were not in the best
interests of the company's shareholders.5 3 Proposals changing the
composition of the board of directors to increase the representation
of those who would not be dominated by or beholden to the CEO
would provide changes for the better. Jacobs's second proposal deals
more directly with this.

50. See LORSCH, supra note 1, at 18 (63% of all Fortune 1000 outside directors
are chief executive officers of other corporations).

51. The Business Roundtable, which consists of CEOs of America's largest
corporations, would institutionalize this relationship, at least according to its 1990
report on corporate governance. The Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and

American Competitiveness, Mar. 1990, at 13-14, reprintedin 46 Bus. LAW. 241-52 (1990).
See generally Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON
L. REv. 197, 221-24 (1991) (discussing the differences between the Business Roundt-

able's 1978 and 1990 reports and concluding that the 1990 report recommends
increasing a CEO's authority, while decreasing a CEO's accountability to shareholders).

52. In many of these cases, the courts intervened to set aside, or at least
question, the defensive action. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction
Market for Corporate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL.

L. REv. 65, 90-91 n.87 (1989) (containing a collection of these types of cases).
53. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 51, at 214-17 (noting some of the more
egregious cases of management-initiated buy-outs). See also Mark J. Loewenstein,
Book Review, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 135 (1990) (reviewing ARTHUR FLEiSCIER, JR.
ET AL., BOARD GAME

(1988)) (refuting the claim that boards of directors act

independently from the influence of the corporation's management).
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B.

Election of Directors

Jacobs proposes that shareholders be provided greater access to
the corporation's proxy statement in order to facilitate the election
of their nominees for directors. He implies that greater shareholder
involvement in the election of directors is almost a panacea to the

shortcomings in corporate governance: "With effective representation, all other issues will fall into place. "5 * Jacobs makes two suggestions to allow for increased shareholder involvement in corporate
governance. First, he proposes that SEC rules, which effectively

prohibit large shareholders from coordinating their voting activities
without full disclosure, be repealed. 5 Second, any "group" owning
at least five percent of the outstanding stock of a company should
be allowed to nominate "someone" to serve on the board and
"provide a brief statement in the proxy as to why they have proposed
56
this person for the board."1

These proposals are far too modest. There is no thought in
these proposals about how large a representation, in terms of the
proportion of board membership, that the "shareholders" ought to
have. On a board of directors with fifteen or so members, 57 one
might question whether one person is likely to have much influence.
Moreover, given the propensity of boards to maneuver around reform, it is not unlikely that the size of the typical board would
expand through bylaw amendment, diluting the effect of the new
outsiders.
One might reasonably wonder why a five percent group of
shareholders (or maybe a somewhat higher percentage) ought not to
have the right to nominate a full slate of directors with corresponding
access to the proxy statement.53 Or, to take the proposal one step
further, why not limit both the right to nominate directors and the
right of access to the proxy statement to such shareholders? Management would then be foreclosed from nominating individuals to

54. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 226.
55. Id. at 227-28.
56. Id. at 228. The proposal that a five percent shareholder be able to nominate
directors is not a novel suggestion. See MELVIN A. EISENBERO, THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATION 117-21 (1976).
57. The average size of the board of directors for the Fortune 1000 companies
is 13. LoRSCH, supra note 1, at 19 (citing HEDRiCKs & STRUGGLES, ITC., THE
CHANGING BOARD 2 (1987)).

58. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Untfjing Ownrship and Control in
the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. Rav. 881 (1989).
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the board unless it owned, in the aggregate, the requisite percentage
59
of shares.
The implication of Jacobs's modesty is that he does not fully
trust shareholders with the power to select the board. In this respect,
he has much in common with most people proposing reforms in
corporate governance. For instance, one popular proposal calls for
the creation of shareholder advisory committees, which would consist
of holders of large amounts of shares or their designees. 60 As characterized by one commentator, "[t]he purpose of the committees
would be to provide a forum through which shareholders could
communicate with board members and '[to] institutionalize a procedure for developing and communicating shareholder input."'61
In addition to being modest, a shareholder advisory committee
is likely to be ineffectual. Such committees would consist of the large
shareholders, including representatives from the trust departments
of large banks, public retirement plans and the College Retirement
Equity Fund. 62 It is doubtful that many of these representatives
would have the necessary expertise to make a meaningful contribution
to the corporations that they would be advising. More importantly,
would these representatives have access to the necessary information
and would they devote the necessary time and resources to the position
even if they had the requisite training and expertise? Given the free
rider problem, would it be worth the time of any individual shareholder who owns a tiny percent of the outstanding stock to undertake
this effort, especially when there is no assurance that the advice will
have an impact on the ultimate decisions of the board and man-

59. It is unfortunate, in my view, that so many shares of stock have been
given outright to corporate management in recent years. These giveaways, which
are part of executive compensation plans and intended to align management's
interest with the shareholders', are ill-advised and excessive. They are ill-advised
because increasing management's ownership interest in the corporation might well
have the effect of encouraging management to be too conservative. The giveaways
are excessive because, in some cases, they have had the effect of shifting significant
control and staggering value to management, diluting the holdings of shareholders
who paid cash for their ownership interest. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1624 (noting that management controlled firms are more likely to be risk adverse and
that such firms tend to retain earnings).
60. See Jayne W. Barnard, InstitutionalInvestors and the New Corporate Governance,
69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1135-40 (1991).
61. Id. at 1139 (quoting proxy statement of Avon Products, Inc., at 25
(Mar. 30, 1990)).
62. See id. at 1175-87 app. A.
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agement? These and other doubts about the proposal have led some
commentators to conclude that the advisory committees would "merely
formalize existing management-shareholder exchanges" already in
63
place in many companies and add little else.

The tentative nature of Jacobs's proposal calling for shareholder
advisory committees is also a common characteristic of the proposals
of other prominent commentators. Focusing on the same problems
discussed by Jacobs, Columbia University Law Professor Louis Lowenstein proposed that shareholders be empowered "to nominate,
separately from the nomination of directors generally, a significant
but still minority number of additional directors, e.g., 20-25 percent
of the board." ' Lowenstein envisions that these "very independent"
directors, as he calls them, would engage in an ongoing dialogue
with management, sharing their insights into how the corporation
65
might be better managed.

Although these directors would be equal to the "regular" directors in terms of voting power and access to information, they
might end up with the influence of a shareholder advisory committee.
Bearing in mind that "outside" directors are regularly criticized for
spending too little time on the job of directing, it is fair to ask
whether these "very independent" directors would spend more time.
Like the members of the shareholder advisory committees, the directors nominated by the large shareholders would have other, more
pressing commitments than serving as "very outside" directors.
Furthermore, even if they had the time, would they have the necessary
expertise? The very idea that shareholders should nominate only one
director (Jacobs's proposal) or a quarter (Lowenstein's proposal) of
the board suggests some serious doubt about the capabilities and
effectiveness of these "shareholder directors."
A more direct approach is set forth in a recent article co-authored
by Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, partners in a New York
law firm well-known for advising corporations involved in control
contests. 65 Lipton and Rosenblum believe that the specter of a possible

63. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 872.
64. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 209.
65. Id. at 210-11.
66. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1. The authors are partners in the New
York law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
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takeover, among other things, has caused corporate management to
become obsessed with short-term profitability in order to keep the
stock price high. 67 To enable management to better focus on the
long term, they recommend that the directors face the shareholders
only once every five years, rather than annually. 6 The authors would

combine this with a few other key reforms, including a change in
the takeover laws prohibiting a change of control between "quinquennial" elections except under extraordinary circumstances, 69 and
greater access to the quinquennial proxy statement for large shareholders.70 Thus, the quinquennial election becomes a referendum on
the success, or failure, of corporate management over the previous
five years. 7 Presumably, shareholders will carefully study corporate
results over the past five years, compare them to management's plans
and projections, and then decide whether a change of direction is
72

in order.

The Lipton-Rosenblum proposal, though interesting, is seriously
flawed. It does not promise better or more effective monitoring from
the board of directors because that institution would remain virtually
unchanged. Lipton and Rosenblum express the hope that boards
would be motivated to do a better job because they will face a "real"
election after a period of time, motivating them to work more closely
with the shareholders who vote in that election. 7 3 But the problem

in corporate governance is not that directors lack the motivation to
do well, but rather that they are not equipped to do well.
A somewhat more aggressive, and promising, proposal has been
made by Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman. They
propose the creation of a "core of professional directors.''" The
Gilson-Kraakman proposal is similar to the Lowenstein proposal, in
that it seeks to elect a minority of directors to a board; however, it

departs from Lowenstein's and other proposals by identifying a source
for these directors. Gilson and Kraakman suggest that institutional

67. Id. at 188, 208. Lipton and Rosenblum also believe that the short-term
investing practices of institutional investors is an additional cause of corporate
management's short-termism. Id. at 205-13.
68. Id. at 225-30.
69. Id. at 225-26, 229-30.
70. Id. at 226.
71. Id. at 225.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 227.
74. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 883.
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investors, who already have the votes to elect directors, elect people
who would be in the business of directing companies.75 Although such a
cadre of professional directors does not now exist, they speculate
that one could be developed either by a clearinghouse organized by
institutional investors or by the pioneering efforts of one or more
institutions.7 6 These professional directors would come from the business world (for instance, senior partners at major accounting firms)
and would limit themselves (or be limited by the clearinghouse) to
approximately six directorships each.77 The aggregate pay from this
number of directorships would be significant enough to induce qualified people to undertake this career. 7 Because each director would
sit on the boards of several corporations, they would be independent
of each individual corporation. 79 Most importantly, these professional
directors would be dependent on, and accountable to, the shareholders
who elected them.8
C.

Executive Compensation

Consistent with the theme of Short-Tern America, Jacobs seeks
to redesign executive and director compensation in order to enhance
long-term corporate profitability. For instance, Jacobs recommends
that senior executives receive roughly one-half of their compensation
inlong-term incentives such as restricted stock that would vest over
a five year period if certain standards are reached.8 ' Jacobs suggests
that one governing standard might be whether the market price of
the stock increases by twenty percent per annum.8 If this condition
occurs, twenty percent of the restricted stock would be allocated to
the executive.8 If the stock doubles over a five year period, all of
the stock under the plan would vest."4 This proposal is ironic. If
annual vesting is based on stock price, and a large portion of the
executive's compensation is tied to stock market performance, management might become even more short-term oriented, especially if
it still views the investment community as short-term oriented. A

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 885-86.
Id. at 886-88.
Id. at 885-86.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id.
JAcoBs, supra note 2, at 241.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
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prospective investment that would not bear returns for five or ten
years might become less attractive to an officer who is highly dependent on the stock price in a year or less. On the other hand,
an investment with an immediate return, enhancing quarterly profits
for the next eight quarters, might be more attractive if the manager
is thinking about his or her own interests.
There is a second, fundamental problem with this proposal. This
proposal ignores broader economic factors that heavily influence stock
market prices. In a global economy, political upheaval in one part
of the world can affect world-wide interest rates, which, in turn, can
affect world-wide stock market prices. For example, the recent oil
price shocks had a dramatic effect on a number of industries and
stock prices. Stock market prices do reflect the fortunes of a publiclyheld company over the long term. But, for these purposes, five years
is not a long term. Similarly, this proposal ignores the effect of
business cycles that even the best managed firms cannot avoid.
Finally, a proposal in which management is so heavily invested
in the corporation can have negative effects for the company's shareholders. Shareholders are diversified in their investments and are
generally risk neutral with respect to any individual investment. In
comparison, corporate managers are heavily invested in both their

personal wealth and human capital in the company for which they
work. If the firm fails, they have far more to lose than the typical
diversified shareholder.
For these and other reasons, 85 corporate managers tend to be
risk averse. This course of conduct is quite often contrary to the
shareholders' interests. For instance, a risk averse attitude may cause
a manager to avoid leverage and finance growth through internallygenerated funds. 86 This attitude also discourages managers from
investing in risky, long-term projects, when the alternatives assure
the continued viability of the firm. Moreover, risk aversion creates
an incentive for corporate managers to diversify the firm, investing
in other businesses in order to reduce the manager's loss resulting
from business cycles. Each of these courses of action is, or may be,
adverse to the long-term interests of shareholders. Yet each is an

85. For example, managers risk their jobs while shareholders merely risk their
investment. Moreover, managers risk personal liability in the event of corporate
failure or financial distress. Coffee, supra note 1, at 17-19.
86. Corporate directors and senior management face potential liability that
shareholders do not. See id. at 21.
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understandable consequence of corporate managers' risk aversion.
Jacobs's proposal would only exacerbate this phenomenon because
his solution increases the manager's stake in the firm.87
If it is true that managers are risk averse in relation to shareholders and this risk aversity negatively affects shareholders, it would
seem prudent to modify the compensation in order to close the
differential. Such a compensation arrangement would assure the
manager long-term employment, some incentive compensation based
on meeting long-term goals and some disincentives for undertaking
policies that seek to minimize the manager's personal risks, such as
unnecessary corporate diversification. But these anticipated results
may be too much to ask of a compensation arrangement. What this
suggests is that corporate managers need a strong counter-weight in
the decision-making arena and that there is no substitute for a board
of directors or some other monitoring arrangement that will assume
more of the authority and responsibility for the direction of the
corporation.
To boost this sense of responsibility, Jacobs proposes that outside
directors be compensated solely in corporate stock, in order to align
the directors' interests with those of the shareholders.Y But implicit
in this proposal is the assumption that compensation, and specifically
stock compensation, would motivate individuals to serve on corporate
boards and affect their decision-making process. Unfortunately, there
is empirical evidence that neither compensation nor stock ownership
motivates individuals to accept corporate directorships.e If this is
true, then paying directors solely in corporate stock would be unlikely
either to attract directors or influence their decisions.
Even assuming that stock would motivate outside directors to
make the sort of decisions that better reflect the long-term interests
of the corporation, large amounts of stock may be required to accomplish this goal. Outside directors, after all, tend to be wealthy

87. Another aspect of the Jacobs's proposal is that the amount of the exe-

cutive's base compensation be reduced drastically-he suggested a base of $250,000
annually for the CEO of a large publicly-held company. JACOBS, supra note 2, at

241. This might make the executive even more risk averse, as the stock portion of
his compensation becomes relatively more significant to him.
88. Id. at 243.
89. See LORSCH, supra note 1, at 26. In fact, the survey of Fortune 1000
directors conducted by Professor Lorsch disclosed that compensation was the second
least important reason (among nine) for accepting a directorship, and major stock
ownership was the least important. The intellectual stimulation and exposure to
new ideas were the most important factors. Id.
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individuals whose primary source of income is outside of the corporation. Because these individuals would naturally value stock lower
than cash, and because by definition the amount of stock would
have to be material in relation to the director's personal wealth, the
cost to the corporation may be significant.
On the other hand, it may be that a lesser amount of stock
would be sufficient to give directors a psychological identification
with the corporation that is currently lacking. One commentator has
speculated that stock ownership would "strengthen the directors'
sense of purpose and their resolve to work actively together." 90 The
proposal is not costly and is unlikely to do any harm. It is, therefore,
worth trying. Again, however, this proposal is not a substitute for
more meaningful reform in the composition of corporate boards.
III.

THE COST OF CAPITAL: A

SUBSIDIARY CAUSE OF SHORT

TERMISM?

A second cause of business myopia, discussed at some length
in the book, is one that is long-standing: the cost of capital in the
United States exceeds the cost of capital for our competitors." Here,
Jacobs is on well-plowed ground; much has been written on the
relative cost of capital in the United States and abroad, and this
literature fairly consistently concludes that the cost of capital, particularly equity capital, is higher in the United States.92 Jacobs seeks
to explain why equity capital is more expensive than debt 9 and why
American companies face a higher cost of equity capital than foreign
competitors.9 4 Jacobs also discusses his own view that American

90. Id. at 177.
91. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 11-16.
92. See Albert Ando & Alan J. Auerbach, The Cost of Capital in Japan and the
United States: A Comparison, 2 J. OF THE JAPANESE & INT'L ECONOMIES 134 (1988);
Ted Fikre, Equity Carve-Outs in Tokyo, 15 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV.
60 (1991); Robert N. McCauley & Steven A. Zimmer, Explaining International
Differences in the Cost of Capital, 14 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV. 7 (1989);
James M. Poterba, Comparing the Cost of Capital in the United States and Japan: A
Survey of Methods, 15 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV. 20 (1991) (citing B.
Douglas Bernheim & John B. Shove, Taxation and the Cost of Capital: An International
Comparison, in CHARLES E. WALKER & MARK A. BLOOMFIELD, THE CONSUMPTION
TAX: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? (1987)); George N. Hatsopolous & Stephen H. Brooks,

The Cost of Capital in the United States andJapan (paper presented at the International
Conference on the Cost of Capital, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Nov. 19-21, 1987)).
93. JAcoBs, supra note 2, at 173-74.

94. Id. at 174-78.
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companies are under-leveraged, exacerbating our competitive dis95
advantage.
Tax laws are a major factor in making equity more expensive
than debt. As Jacobs notes, under the United States tax laws, earnings
of American companies distributed to shareholders are subject to
double taxation-unlike earnings of companies in Germany and
Japan.95 Because an American corporation can deduct interest payments on debt, but not dividends, it faces a higher after-tax cost on
equity than debt, even assuming that a provider of equity requires
the same return on investment that a provider of debt required. 97
Since equity is riskier than debt, however, the problem is compounded
because the equity investor requires a higher return than the debt
financier.9 8 Jacobs seems to be on firm ground with this theory.
But Jacobs goes further, arguing that American corporations
face a higher cost of equity than foreign corporations and use relatively too much of it." According to Jacobs, American investors
require a higher rate of return on their equity investments in United
States corporations than do foreign investors when investing in their
corporations because, in short, American investors view their equity
investments to be riskier than foreign investors view their equity
investments. 10 0 To compensate for this greater risk, American investors naturally require a higher rate of return than their foreign
counterparts. Jacobs believes that American investors have this negative view because of their minimal role in corporate governance,
which regards corporate management as being "distant" and relatively unaccountable to the company's shareholders.10 ' This lack of
communication, and resulting distrust, translates into a perceived
risk for the investor in the United States.
Jacobs may be correct in his view that the American system of
corporate governance is in need of reform, but it is entirely unclear
how this relates to the relative cost of equity capital. German and
Japanese shareholders, who are the counterparts that Jacobs has in
mind, are at least as distant as their American counterparts and, in
many respects, more so. In Japan, major corporations participate in

95. Id. at 192-93.
96. Id. at 173-74.

97. Jacobs, supra note 2, at 173.
98. Id. at 174.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 12, 15-16.
101. Id. at 192.
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affiliations, called "keiretsu," in which stock is cross-owned by members of the keiretsu, and corporations' executives sit on one another's
boards. The "public" shareholders who might trade the corporation's
stock (as opposed to the members of the keiretsu, who are not active
traders), have virtually no influence on the corporation's management
or direction. 10 2 Public shareholders in Japan place their trust in the
management to a far greater extent than American shareholders,
who at least retain the possibility of a proxy contest and a hostile
takeover. Yet, according to Jacobs, the Japanese shareholders seem
to feel that the corporate structure places them less at risk than
03
American shareholders.
Similarly, in publicly-held German corporations (which are rare
because most are not publicly held), the outside shareholder is somewhat distant. The "owner" function is exercised by large banks that,
as a practical matter, control the large German corporations through
substantial equity ownership and the appointment of directors.
Even assuming that German and Japanese corporations trade
at higher multiples of price to earnings than American corporations

(thereby signifying that equity investors require a lower rate of return
and are willing to assume greater risk), it is difficult to draw many
conclusions from this fact alone. It may simply be that a larger
portion of American corporations could be classified as mature institutions where slower growth may be expected. The fact that Apple
Computers is selling for thirteen times trailing earnings, while Microsoft is selling for thirty-three times, may relate more to the relative
growth prospects in the computer hardware industry, as compared
to the software industry, rather than to the relative managements
of the two companies. Again, the reader is asked to accept a notion

that seems somewhat questionable: that the cost of equity is higher
in the United States (tax considerations aside) because foreign cor-

102. Indeed, most Japanese corporations schedule their annual shareholders'
meetings on the same day, making it impossible for most shareholders to attend
more than one meeting. Once there, moreover, the opportunity for a shareholder
to influence the course of the meeting, much less the direction of the corporation,
is minimal, at best. See Christopher L. Heftel, Corporate Governance in Japan: The
Position of Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135 (1983).
103. See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 66-69.
The enormous decline in Japanese share prices over the past two years (July
1990 to July 1992), during which the Japanese Nikkei average declined approximately
51%, while the U.S. S&P 500 increased approximately 14%, sheds at least some
doubt on the notion that Japanese equities are somehow viewed more favorably
than American equities.
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porations have a better management structure than American companies. That is not to say that American corporations are, on average,
as well managed as their foreign competitors, but rather that the
relationship between cost of equity and management structure is
likely to be a subtle one. Such subtleties are largely ignored in ShortTerm America.
Finally, Jacobs suggests that the cost of capital problem is exacerbated because foreign companies have a higher proportion of
debt, which is cheaper than equity.' ° As noted above, providers of
equity demand a higher return than providers of debt because their
risk is greater. Equity holders are residual claimants, realizing a
return only after prior claimants, including debt holders, have been
satisfied. Jacobs provides no support for the claim that American
companies are relatively under-leveraged, °5 but a possible reason
provided is that debt is too risky for American companies because
creditors in the United States are less willing to work with their
customers than are Japanese and German banks.'"5 Presumably,
American banks are less patient and less supportive than non-American banks and, therefore, American companies are less willing to
10 7
take on considerable debt.
If, as appears to be the case, the cost of capital is higher in
the United States than abroad, then equalizing the cost may restore
American industry to competitiveness. Jacobs, however, does not
believe that is the case at all. Indeed, the chapter on capital costs
follows the longer section of the book discussing institutional investing
and corporate governance. Jacobs believes that capital costs are a
secondary cause of America's short-termism. Of course, there is no

104. Id. at 16.

105. Other commentators have opined that U.S. corporations are over-leveraged. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 211 (stating that "[t]he focus
on the short term has also led to the over-leveraging of our economy").
106. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 146-47.
107. It would appear that determining the proper amount of debt is a difficult
decision for any corporate manager and that special problems arise for corporate
managers in publicly-held companies. When the manager's most important asset
is his job with the firm, he is likely to be more risk averse in comparison to the
shareholders. The manager cannot afford for the firm to become financially insolvent.
Insolvency would put his job at risk as well as any investment that he might have
in the firm. By comparison, shareholders are likely to be diversified and would
prefer more risk than managers. See Coffee, supra note 1. Suffice it to say, if
Professor Coffee is correct in his assessment, then the relevant inquiry is not the
form of corporate management per se, but rather the risk preference of those making
the management decision, be they senior managers, or outside directors.
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easy way to determine to what extent America's current economic
malaise is attributable to the cost of capital, but, a closer examination

of the evidence that management is not short-term oriented suggests
that the cost of capital looms as a larger cause.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Short-Term America is an ambitious book, exploring more topics
than are discussed above, and suggesting thoughtful solutions to the
problems identified. Like any highly ambitious project, it is open to
many criticisms, some of which have been identified in this essay.
This book's greatest contribution is the recognition that America's
lack of competitiveness may be attributable to many different causes
and the realization that there are no simple solutions to these problems. Other recent work has over-emphasized the importance of
corporate governance reform to the exclusion of needed reforms in
the banking industry and in laws affecting capital formation in
general. 108 This book, however, fails to identify changes that would
truly make a difference in the area of corporate governance. Jacobs
seems to assume that directors who are nominated directly by shareholders, rather than the board's nominating committee, would somehow be better directors. The failures of directors, however, are
probably as much attributable to the structure of the board as to
the identity of its members. Little can be expected of a board of
directors as long as board membership is a part-time position, led
by senior corporate management. The role of the board will be
different only when it can lead management, not vice versa. This
will only happen when the board has the means and the incentive
to undertake such a role.
Thus, the sort of tinkering suggested by Jacobs and others will
not make a meaningful difference. What is called for, if anything,
is a more radical change. The work of Gilson and Kraakman, calling
for the creation of a cadre of professional directors, is a step in that
direction.

108. See supra note 1.

